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Thatcher’s Perceptual illusion is presented as a case study to test the fruitfulness of 
helmuth Plessner’s aesthesiology for contemporary philosophical and empirical research 
on sensory perception (§1). in one reading, Thatcher illusion’s seems to question gestalt 
Theory. We argue that it limits ideed its explanatory power, by forcing us to distinguish 
physiognomic identity from emotional expression (§2). although integrating gestalt 
Theory, aesthesiology takes a further step into a thorough criticism of contemporary 
reductions of Phenomenal Consciousness in terms of Qualia: an embodied-enactive 
theory of perception (§3). Plessner’s insights into geometry and music as “symbolic 
forms” grounded, respectively, on goal-directed action/objects manipulation, and on 
emotional expression are expounded (§4). The Thatcher’s illusion’s Puzzle is solved on the 
basis of this Plessnerian distinction (§5).
EMBODIED VISUAL PERCEPTION.  
AN ARGUMENT FROM PLESSNER (1923)* 
*The whole editorial board of Phenomenology and mind and the present writer wish to express their gratitude to matt Bower for his 
extremely competent english translation of Plessner’s awkward language, his very useful Translator’s note and, last but not least, the 
untiring patience with which he has tried to give this Commentary a greater resemblance to english.
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does helmuth Plessner’s “aesthesiology” still have anything to say to 
contemporary philosophers and empirical researchers on perception?
let’s start from a very popular experimental case study: the so-called 
thatcher illusion.1
Most of us are incapable of detecting – at least at first sight -  a crucial  
difference between these two images  when they are upside down. 
yet a dramatic difference immediately strikes us  the moment the images are 
rotated in their “normal” upright position:
here we suddenly notice a  big difference. And upon reflection, we may 
further realize that the emotional difference in expression is obtained 
artificially, through photo-shopping.
there is one possible explanation that might work – although, i will argue, it 
1 thompson, P. (1980), "margaret thatcher: a new illusion", Perception 9, pp. 483-484.
1. 
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"Aesthesiology"
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is importantly limited because it treats only part of this phenomenon, and 
not the most interesting one. the part thus “explained” is  the “recognition” 
of the physiognomic identity in the upside-down images: “aha, it’s margaret 
thatcher!” this identity recognition would be a sort of illusion, for the 
second upside-down image “is” not at all  margaret thatcher, or a proper 
image of her, but a poorly and very crudely altered image, constructed by 
rotating the eyes and mouth in an unnatural way.
this explanation can be read as a partial refutation of a gestalt thesis. 
the illusion would prove that eyes and mouth have such a key role in the 
recognition of  a face’s identity (of its physiognomy) , that we recognize  a 
face in spite of the alteration of its  configuration or gestalt,  simply in virtue 
of  its  individual features by themselves. contrary to Köhler’s prediction  
we do  “recognize”    the true facial expression (of margaret thatcher) even 
when upside down, without noticing the photoshop. When the images are 
turned aright, we do notice that certain features were upside down – so the 
second image is “not really” an image of m. thatcher, but a distortion of it 
through photo-shop. this “illusion” then would prove that “compositional” 
information primes “configural” or gestalt  information in the coding of 
facial identity recognition – even at the cost of cognitive error.2
this explanation still leaves the most interesting part of the phenomenon 
unexplained: why is it that we do perceive a grotesque, and yet perfectly 
meaningful change of emotional expression in the upright second image? if 
we did not know that the image was manipulated by photo-shopping and 
that it thus  “distorts reality”, it would strike us – as it does anyway –as a 
very telling caricature, or a grimacing expression of that visage.  Why did 
we not see that change of emotional expression in the upside down setting? Why 
were we deluded into failing to detect the additional expressive qualities of the 
second image? isn’t there a more serious illusion here (missing the evident 
2  thompson’s own reading of this illusion recalls Köhler’s remark “that  upside-down faces 
are hard to recognise because of the loss of facial expression in such faces”. but since a very 
famous visage like this one is easily recognized by most subjects even when upside-down, 
thompson’ conclusion – if there is one in his paper – seems to be rather against an explanation 
of face perception in terms of configural or Gestalt visual information, as opposed to compositional 
information. Since  eyes and mouth convey most information about a face, “it seems possible that 
an inverted face in which the eyes and mouth remain the normal way round might preserve the 
facial expression better than a truly inverted face”. and this prediction comes true, or this would 
be what the illusions shows. Unfortunately thompson uses “facial expression” in an ambiguous 
way, without  distinguishing between physiognomic identity and emotional expression. Without this 
ambiguity there is no means to reject Köhler’s thesis that configural information plays a major 
role in the recognition of the value-qualities of any object of perception. See W. Köhler, (1938),  
The Place of Value in a World of facts, a mentor book, new york 1966. this is why we argue that the 
thatcher illusion forces  us to distinguish physiognomic identity from expression, and lead us to 
the question why rotation in space preserves recognisability of the former, but not of the latter.
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difference in emotional expression)  than in the illusory recognition of the 
same face?
how would Plessner’s aesthesiology explain this phenomenon? let’s proceed 
step by step. Would it yield a convincing analysis of the first part of this 
phenomenon? 
First of all, the claim that configural or Gestalt visual information, as opposed 
to compositional information, is involved in recognition of facial expressions 
would have been endorsed by Plessner. die einheit der Sinne is abundant in 
quotations from the founders of berlin’s gestalt Psychology – Wolfgang 
Köhler, max Wertheimer, and Kurt Koffka, who had been students of carl 
Stumpf (1848-1936), the very  founder of experimental Phenomenology.3 
edmund husserl , another of Stumpf’s students and Plessner’s doktorvater, 
dedicated his first major phenomenological work, the logical investigations, 
to him – and this is certainly not surprising when one thinks of Stumpf’s 
definition of phenomenology as the study of the “essential”, “structural” 
laws of perceptual phenomena – of its “material apriori”, as husserl would 
have it. Plessner himself quotes the most famous of Stump’s “laws”: “an 
essential (necessary) state of affairs of the optic sense domain (Sinneskreis) 
says that to every color phenomenon belongs an extension, even if one can 
hardly identify this phenomenal extension with the two dimensionality of a 
surface in the geometrical sense. We propose a corresponding acoustic  law: a 
sound is essentially given with a volume”.4 
Some additional information about Plessner’s background may be helpful 
for contemporary readers. born in 1892, helmuth Plessner studied zoology 
and philosophy in heidelberg, berlin and göttingen. in göttingen, he was 
a student of husserl’s, and also of david Katz’, a psychologist who had 
likewise studied with husserl (and with the goettingen psychologist georg 
elias müller). Katz, while very close to the gestalt movement (on which he 
also wrote a very popular introduction)5, was also critical of it, and very 
much along phenomenological lines. We shall find an echo of his criticism 
in Plessner’s aesthesiology. looming in the background of die einheit der 
Sinne is a very specific set of concerns arising from the field of experimental 
3 Spiegelberg, h. (1982), The Phenomenological movement, third revised and enlarged edition, 
with the collaboraton of Karl Schuhmannn, nijhoff, the hague, pp. 51-65.
4 Plessner, h. (1923), die einheit der Sinne – grundlinien einer aesthesiologie des geistes, in 
anthropologie der Sinne (gesammelte Schriften III, Suhrkamp, Frankfirt a.M. 2003, p. 231.
5 Katz, d. (1944), gestaltpsychologie. basel 1944 ( translated into english, Swedish, Spanish, 
italian, Finnish und French – but of course his collaborations with the gestalt psycholgists trace 
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psychologyand especially the then pioneering works of ewald hering6 and 
david Katz7 on colour and space perception, both quoted in the introduction 
of Plessner’s book.  edmund husserl of course, and max Scheler as well, are 
also referred to in Plessner’s introduction; yet the primary impetus toward 
the new research project Plessner was to develop after his “aesthesiology 
of the mind”, and which issued in 1928 in the emergentist ontology of 
die Stufen des Organischen und der mensch,8 might be seen in Stumpf’s idea 
of phenomenology as a universal pre-science, that is a description of all 
the immediately given contents of our acts and functions, to serve as 
foundations of  both natur- und geisteswissenschaften. 
let’s return to our question. the thatcher illusion forces us to distinguish 
between physiognomic identity and emotional expression. We must admit 
that the former is recognized when upside down, but the latter is not.  
Köhler was right after all, since he referred to expressions. but then, why 
do we recognize the face and not its changing expression when the image 
is reversed? Why did we miss the  change of emotional expression in the two 
images when turned upside down? What accounts for the loss of relevant 
and meaningful information (if a caricature can be meaningful without 
being “realistic”) about such prominent expressive qualities?
because Sehen ist Stehen, Plessner would likely answer. the notion of haltung, 
attitude and quite particularly bodily attitude is the central idea of the 
whole book. the involvement of the lived body in perceptual experience, its 
role in the constitution of the apparent visual, tactile, auditory world; the 
roles that  action, posture, balance play in the “meaningful” organization 
of a perceptual scene: all these points take many pages of analyses in 
Plessner’s aesthesiology, and, unsurprisingly, not just in the 1923 book. the 
enactive, embodied character of sensory perception in all its modalities, the 
constitution of the perceived world within the field of action of the perceiving 
subject, the meaningful organization of a perceptual environment through 
6 hering is the author of the still widely accepted theory  of the visual system as based on 
a system of colour opponency. hering’s proposal is now widely recognized as nearer to the 
neurophysiological truth than Helmoltz’ three-colours theory, although Hering’s findings are 
essentially “phenomenologically” based. e. hering (1872-1874), Zur lehre vom lichtsinn, leipzig 
1907, quoted by Plessner (1923), p. 13.
7 Katz, d. (1911), Die Erscheinungswesen der Farben und ihre Beeinflussung durch die individuelle 
erfahrung , leipzig, quoted by Plessner (1923), who describe it as “determined by husserl in its 
basic principles”, referring also to P.F. linke (1918), grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre, 
münchen, which “points to the relationships between experimental psychology and ontological-
phenomenological research” (Plessner (1923), p. 14).
8 Plessner, h. (1928), die Stufen des Organischen und der mensch. einleitung in die philosophische 
anthropologie  
berlin / leipzig 1928: Walter de gruyter & co.
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the affordances it provides: these notions were quite familiar within the 
earlier phases of the phenomenological movement, much before they were 
reworked by maurice merleau-Ponty and, more recently, made popular by 
such embodied mind approaches such as andy clark, alva noë’s or vittorio 
gallese’s, not to mention Shaun gallagher’s and dan Zahavi’s works. the 
husserlian formula of the lived body as “centre of orientation for the 
surrounding  space” is the starting point for Plessner’s solution of the problem 
of “the unity of senses”, namely, the problem of how information coming from 
the different sensory modalities can be “put together” into an apparently 
coherent, solid, meaningful  world  as our life-world.
So, before suggesting some hints concerning a “Plessnerian” way to 
interpret a vast class of phenomena like the thatcher illusion, let us 
introduce the reader to the selection of (at times impervious) pages from the 
long 1923 essay, die einheit der Sinne – grundlinien einer aesthesiologie des geistes, 
in matt bower’s english translation. 
the opening of this selection mentions an “initial problem”, for which the 
argument developed throughout the book up to that point is purported 
to provide a solution. it may be useful to read in Plessner’s own words (or 
rather in our translation of them) which was this problem – at least as it is 
presented at the very beginning of the book, namely in the introduction:
“if physics deals with the true state of the world, is our experience of the 
world only a  colorful although unavoidable epiphenomenon, a sort of 
involuntary luminescence of certain material events in the cells and paths 
of the brain? Are then the qualities of our sensations, which are specifically 
bound to some definite sense organs, nothing but illusions, appearances? Or 
is rather the world-image of physics and chemistry in its uniformity just a 
black and white sketch, artificially taken from the whole picture of manifest 
reality, an abstraction designed to simplify nature to the end of mastering 
it practically? [is this abstraction not] a conceptual transformation that 
forbids us to attach any spectre of reality to appearances?”9
“it is a fact that natural science and psychology cannot explain in the least 
the way of appearing of this world (die erscheinungsweise dieser Welt)”10
as Plessner sees the matter (at the beginning of our selection), the problem 
of the unity of the senses (i.e., of the objects we perceive through their 
9  Plessner, h. (1923), einfürung, p. 25.
10  ibid., p. 23, Plessner’s italics.
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quite different modalities) must be connected with “the question of the 
objectivity of the senses, an age-old theme of philosophy” (hence the title 
of the section we translated): the just quoted texts give expression to this 
question. 
the background against which the young Plessner thinks is still a (neo)Kantian 
one. yet a Kantian solution based on the “pure forms of intuition” (space and 
time) is rejected along the lines of phenomenological or gestaltist arguments, 
rejecting the whole idea of an unorganized plurality of sense-data, upon which 
the “forms” of space and time and the categories of the understanding would 
impose their order:
“the claim that every colour, independently of its empirically changing 
way of appearing, is a ‘flat quale’ in Hering’s sense, or that to each colour 
matter (Katz) belongs an extension in Stumpf’s sense, imply essential states 
of affairs about colours, which neither physical nor physiological optics can 
explain, and are valid independently of measure determinations”.11
in the body of the book, though, something more is accomplished than 
a search for material a priori (à la hering, Katz, or Stumpf) “organizing” 
perceptual data. a genuinely novel and original step is taken here. the 
“problem of the objectivity of the senses”  is no longer conceived of as an 
epistemological one. beyond the sceptical or epi-phenomenalist doubt 
about reliability of sensory experience, the mind-body problem comes into 
view. neither materialism (“monistic parallelism”) nor dualism can possibly 
explain how a meaningful world might be produced out of physical events in 
the brain, or how a conscious mind can change the physical world. 
instead of distinguishing intentional or representative consciousness from 
qualia, as it has been customary in classical cognitivism (but also in the 
empiricist attitude of the famous german physiologists and psychologists, 
like Wundt or helmoltz) Plessner introduces the much more promising 
“perspective of the performance” or accomplishment (leistungsperspektive). 
only this perspective, Plessner suggests, would allow us to ask sensible 
questions about the “quality” of sensory modalities. What does a given 
sensory modality allow a human being (remember, this is an “anthropology 
of the senses”) to do that humans could not have done (in that way) without 
it? the answer lies right before us, made manifest in the achievements 
we are all familiar with in the life-world. We move in space, we act, we 
have goals, we even move without any goal, in a kind of action which 
11  ibid., p. 15.
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seems peculiar to us: expressive movement, such as dance -  at least in it’s 
“gratuitous” development over and above non-human animal “dance”, as  
bound to sexual life and reproduction. 
Plessner would stress a human peculiarity that distinguishes our 
movements from the animal ones: we are agents in a peculiar sense, 
which Plessner will later concentrate on, namely, agents who possess 
a capacity for innovation based on a cognitive skill not shared by other 
primates. it is  an ability which the prominent contemporary evolutionary 
anthropologist michael tomasello12 (ideally, even if not really, an heir of 
Plessner’s anthropology) seems to have (quite independently) re-discovered, 
and which he describes as a capacity of “role-reversal”. in contrast to 
the primates tomasello studied (in Koehler’s tradition, one might say), 
children in early age can “transpose” information acquired from their own 
points of view (or in terms of their zero-point system of coordinates) into 
other persons’ points of view, and vice versa. more generally, humans are 
not exclusively bound to their “centre” or to the ego-centred system of 
coordinates for which  their body is the “origin”.  For this further degree 
of “freedom” (relative to  the animal world) Plessner will later introduce 
the technical term “excentricity”  or “excentrical positionality”, the key-
concept of his anthropology in what is probably his most ambitious and best 
known book, die Stufen des Organischen und der mensch (1928).
“the secret of the indirect method of inquiry consists in leaving the task 
of isolating a sensory quality not to the scholar’s artifice, but allowing the 
isolation to be carried out by human culture and taking note of its results”.13 
We shall at present only hint at the two pillars of this analysis of the sensory 
erscheinungswelt from the perspective of our cultural accomplishments: 
geometry and musics. 
geometry and music, as “symbolic forms”, presuppose a perceptual intuitive 
basis whose structural or gestalt properties organize the field of basic types 
of bodily action or movement: goal directed action, in the case of geometry, 
and purely expressive movement, in the case of music. in seeing and 
hearing, the lived body is involved as an “organon”  of the will (husserl) and 
as a means of emotional expression and communication.
geometry makes the Seinsinn or phenomenal way of being of the visible 
world conceptually explicit. What Plessner discovers in the visual Seinsinn 
12  tomasello, m. (1999), The Cultural Origins of human Cognition, harvard University press, p. 103.
13  Plessner, h., “the objectivity of senses”, m. bower’s translation p. 3.
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(or, a parte subjecti, Sinngebung) is the practicable world, the world of planned 
action and goal-directed movement. music makes the Seinsinn of the audible 
world explicit, which is the world of expressive movement (e.g. dancing, a theme 
later deeply explored by erwin Straus). 
the irreducible, qualitative content of sight and hearing experiences 
are hence not just modes of “phenomenal consciousness” in the sense of 
contemporary cognitivists (i.e., as qualia), but the very modes of presence 
of such aspects of an umwelt as the practical and the expressive milieus, in 
the experience of which we become aware of ourselves as, respectively, 
active and feeling beings. the visual space works as a paradigm of the 
“objective”, the “external” part of reality, as it is given in “the experience of 
encountering” (antreffen). The auditory field, for its part, “versinnlicht”, gives 
body, as it were, to the “inner” or “subjective” part of reality – the emotional 
life and its “rhythm”, as given in emerging awareness (innewerden).14 
“Schematismus” is a structural property of sight as “Thematismus” is one of 
hearing.15 
“Music and geometry, as the specific mental employments of sensory modes, 
are for us only symptoms of what is possible, an aid for understanding what 
would otherwise hide its mystery from us in silent splendor.”16
hearing and sight, construed as sensory modalities essentially involving 
bodily attitudes and ways of acting in the environment, call for a third 
essential mode of sensing which – we may gather – will constitute the very 
basis of both kinesthesis and cenesthesis (touch, inner visceral sense): the 
sense of one’s position-attitude (haltung) and the sense one’s state (Zustand) 
– confirming familiar notions on the central role of lived posture, balance, 
inner condition in any mode of perception.
an example of Plessner’s insightful description of the relationships between 
sight and goal-directed action can be found in several passages in which he 
develops the notion of the “visible” Griffigkeit of objects: 
“the grippiness or handiness (Griffigkeit) of a thing, as it is originally given 
to us at a distance through just the line of sight (….) by itself already entails 
an akkordanz to action”.17
14  ibid., p. 9.
15  Plessner, h. (1923), p. 284.
16  Plessner, h., “the objectivity of senses”, m. bower’s translation p. 4.
17  Plessner, h. (1923), p. 263.
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even more revealing is Plessner’s description of the “architectural” world, 
where what is directly given to the sight are artifacts for use – with their 
functional properties, rooms to inhabit, chairs to sit on, ladders to climb, 
and so on.18
to sum up, Plessner’ aesthesiology seems to provide an approach that 
introduces insightful avenues of research concerning “how the body shapes 
the mind”, to quote Shaun gallagher’s felicitous phrase. 
the solution of thatcher’s puzzle: why is physiognomic identity but not 
emotional expression preserved in upside-down images?
let us conclude this commentary with a suggestion of a possible 
“Plessnerian” supplement to the analysis of the thatcher illusion. if Sehen 
ist Stehen, then surely the organization of a visual field will be disrupted by 
inverting the customary orientation of visual objects on the vertical axis 
– as merleau-Ponty famously proved on the basis of previous experiments 
with image-inverting glasses. yet our blatant oversight of emotional change 
of expression in the reversed visage poses a further, more specific problem. 
Why is emotional expression, as opposed to physiognomic identity, so 
blurred by the unusual orientation?
bodily involvement in sensory experience, both in goal-directed action 
and in expressive attitude, is precisely the solid experimental and 
phenomenological basis on which Plessner will later continue, developing a 
further chapter of aesthesiology and issuing in an important essay written 
in collaboration with the biologist and philosopher F.J.J. buytendijk.19 that 
further chapter is the human face to face. this enlargement of aesthesiology 
is required by the phenomenological attitude lying at the heart of Plessner’s 
study of perception. it is not surprising that Plessner’s research – as that of 
many phenomenologists in those years (the munich circle around lipps, 
moritz geiger,  max Scheler, edith Stein) – concentrates in the following 
years on direct social cognition. it does so, however, from a very peculiar 
point of view: the nature of “expression mimicry” – one of the most 
manifest tendencies of the human body defining it as a personal body. 
once again, the notion of bodily attitude is central to the analysis. at this 
point, one of Plessner’s  leitfaden comes prominently into view: whenever 
configural qualities are expressive qualities, namely carriers of value-
18  ibid., p. 278.
19  Plessner, h. (1925) die deutung des mimiche ausdrucks. ein Beitrag zur lehre  von Bewusstsein 
des anderen ichs, in : ausdruck und menschlichen natur  -gesammelte Schriften vii, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a.m. 2003, pp. 68-128
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saliencies of some sort, sense-experience cannot be separated from the 
experience of sense (i.e., meaning). the natural axis system constituted by 
the standing body prescribes its Sinnrichungen to the surrounding space. 
meaning is disrupted by rotation against that system. a person is not – it 
stays recognizable. its shape its preserved through rotation in space – as 
geometry prescribes. after all  a face is a physical object – if you disregard 
its expression. 
let’s return to the case of  inverted images. take any image of which you can 
appreciate some famous expressive quality – take the most obvious of them, 
the “mysterious” or “ineffable” smile of leonardo’s mona lisa. Put the image 
upside-down. a bewildering experience follows: you shall not “grasp” the 
values, the sense, the quality of that smile any more. it is not that we don’t 
see the shape of it. We do. the “sense” of it is missing, though. We have the 
feeling that we no longer “understand” the expression. this is true with any 
photograph – even of a very familiar person. 
let’s leave the last word to Plessner himself: 
“When somebody says, ‘i see it on his face (ich sehe ihm an), [e.g.,] that he 
is ashamed, that he regrets, that he is furious, that he grieves,’ this does 
not mean that he is given the actual being and way of the other’s lived 
experiences of shame, regret, anger or grief, but only that the enacting 
forms of his behaviour (Verhalten) are given, establishing a certain attitude 
referred to the environment. intersubjective coexistence consists of 
attitudes, ways of behaving (haltungen, Verhaltungen), and the need for 
understanding is satisfied when these changing attitudes reveal some 
interrelation among them and the unity of the situation between the body 
in question and its environment (to which i may belong) is preserved in the 
progress of the whole [….]
Whether one is angry, jealous, grieving, cheerful, jovial, whether one 
is ashamed, regrets or merely acts as though he really were in one of 
these emotional states: this doubt is only solved in the framework of 
the particular situation by considering the gestalt features of the given 
behaviour. Shame, regret, jealousy, anger etc. are here intersubjective 
ways of being for reciprocal communication, in relation to a common 
world (mitwelt), and their identification depends in some measure on the 
development of the situation.”20 
Plessner’s explanation is just a beginning – and yet a very good one. Sehen 
20  Plessner, h. (1925), p. 123; pp. 125-126.
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ist stehen, quite particularly in the human face-to-face: which means that 
we must not reduce a “tertiary” quality, even if it is a felt quality and not 
a “conceptual” or verbal representation, to those purely perceptual traits 
deserving the identification of the perceived things. For real qualities and 
value- or expression qualities are not the same. left uncorrected, this 
confusion would make the most interesting part of the thatcher illusion 
inexplicable – for we do see the thing. We just don’t grasp its sense. 
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